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Cyber attacks have significantly increased over the last few years, where the attackers are highly 
skilled, more organized and supported by other powerful actors to devise attacks towards specific 
targets. To aid the development of a strategic plan to defend against emerging attacks, we present 
a high-level taxonomy along with a cyber defense model to address the interaction and 
relationships between taxonomy elements. A cyber-kinetic reference model which is used widely 
by U.S Air Force is adopted as a baseline for the model and taxonomy development. Asset, 
Cyber Capability, and Preparation Process are the three high-level elements that are presented for 
the cyber defense capability model. The Cyber Capability, as the focal point of the study, uses 
three classifiers to characterize the strategic cyber defense mechanisms, which are classified by 
active, passive and collaborative defense. To achieve a proper cyber defense strategy, the key 
actors, assets and associated preparation procedure are identified. Finally, the proposed 





Cyber Security, Cyber Defense Model, Taxonomy, Cyber Actor, Cyber Attack, and, Active 
Defense, and Passive Defense    
 
 
1. Introduction  
The expansion of cyberspace usage over the past two decades, resulted in access to the internet 
for almost every location on the globe (Choucri et al. 2014). Since 2000, by technological 
enhancement in Information Technology (IT) and improvement in internet networks, the overall 
number of internet users has been dramatically increased by 673 percentages to 2.8 billion users 
(Global Internet Report 2014). Modern societies are highly dependent on IT and notably on the 
internet for survival. IT and information systems will facilitate innovation, product and services, 
and communication for the modern economies.  According to the Global IT Report, The 
productivity  promised by ICT for some nations is estimated to reach up to  10% of their GDP by 
2015 (Klimburg 2012). 
 
Increased reliance on ICT and information systems leads to increase in emerging risks and cyber 
attacks. Cyber attacks are now becoming more sophisticated in terms of impact and scale. A 
large-scale cyber attack spreads in a matter of seconds, leading to substantial damage to 
individuals, corporations, and nation-states. Recently, other cyber actors such as criminals, 
hacktivist, whistleblowers, and cyber fighters became more engaged in the events that take place 
in cyberspace. However, the key dilemma for the governments and organization s is to recover 
from a cyber incident in a timely manner while minimizing the adverse impact. The ultimate goal 
for every nation is to safeguard its sovereignty, economy and critical assets against any national 
threat(Klimburg 2012).In order to mitigate cyber attacks, nation states need to assess their cyber 
capabilities and preparation procedures while identifying the key actors and the critical assets 
associated with them. This approach is very similar to McCumber Cube Model, which refers to 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information systems through technology, human 
factors and, policy and procedures (McCumber 2004).  
 
In conjunction with McCumber’s security model, this Study seeks to illustrate a model for cyber 
defense capability which can be used to prepare and respond to cyber threats. For this reason, the 
main pillars of the current study, cyber defense capability model, are derived from Cyber/Kinetic 
inference model, which is demonstrated by U.S Air force during the advanced course in 
Engineering Cyber Defense Exercise. The rest of the proposed model is based on previous 
studies that are relevant to this setting or covering the defense mechanisms that are already in 
place or would be applicable.        
 
Moreover, the proposed model offers a new taxonomy at a strategic level to assist the users to 
adopt an appropriate defense strategy during cyber incidents. Although a considerable number of 
extant literatures proposed a tactical or operational level taxonomies to classify attacks, 
vulnerabilities or intrusions, to our best knowledge, this is the only study that attempts to 
elucidate the synergy and interaction between various cyber defense capabilities.  
 
The paper starts by presenting the previous taxonomies on cyber attacks and defense in Section 
2.The following section presented the groundwork for the taxonomy by illustrating the cyber 
capability reference model. Section 4 discussed the criteria for an acceptable taxonomy, while 
the proposed taxonomy and the breakdown of the cyber defense capabilities are discussed in 
Section 5. Finally, the conclusion and the future study is presented in Section 6.    
 
 
2. Review of Previous Taxonomies 
Fred Cohen’s (1997) early work has identified 94 different computer attacks and techniques 
under a single classification. Although the findings could help security experts to protect 
computers and Information Systems (IS), the taxonomy is almost a repository or database for 
different kinds of attacks. Lindquist and Johnson (1997) have introduced a new concept which is 
called the dimension of classification which is used to classify specimens based on specific 
attributes. Therefore, they have suggested that all the computer attacks can be classified into two 
dimensions, according either the intrusion technique or intrusion result.   
 
Howard (1998) has presented a process-based taxonomy that classified security incidents 
according to a series of computer attacks and events. The proposed taxonomy divided computer 
attacks into five series of steps that can be taken by an attacker to compromise networks or 
information systems. Although the study offered a practical baseline for cyber attacks, it failed to 
provide enough insight towards the motives and objectives of the attacks. Hansman and Hunt 
(2004) suggested an overarching taxonomy that classified  computer and network attacks into f 
attack vector, target, vulnerability and payload. Although the taxonomy can be used widely at an 
operational level, blended or mixed attacks such as Advances Persistent Threats (APT) cannot be 
categorized properly in taxonomy.     
 
Simmons et al. (2009) suggested a cyber attack taxonomy which called AVOIDIT (Attack 
Vector, Operational Impact, Defense, Information Impact and Target). Distinct from the previous 
studies, it was able to encompass the blended attacks like Stuxnet. As a tactical taxonomy, 
AVOIDIT can be used by the security managers during the security management processes or in 
development of information security policies. In spite of the usefulness and insight, the 
taxonomy is not comprehensive enough to be used for high-level defense strategies that 
safeguard critical infrastructure against cyber threats. 
 
Killouri et al. (2004) declared that the previous studies are mostly attack-centric taxonomies that 
widely can be used by the attackers rather than the system defenders. Hence, they offered a 
taxonomy that could predict whether an intrusion detection system (IDS) can detect all related 
attacks in a particular attack class. The focal point of the study was to signify that the defense-
centric taxonomy offers greater benefit and flexibility for IS defenders rather than attack-centric 
taxonomies. Kjaerland (2005) has studied the cyber intrusions on commercial and government 
sectors. Kjaerland perceived attack and defense-centric taxonomies can be used as 
complementary to estimate the severity of attacks or the suitability of the defense controls.    
 
Scott and Angelos (2013) proposed an extensible taxonomy that could classify events and 
associated impacts by demonstrating the interaction between actors, vector, and types of attacks. 
By using this taxonomy, the end user can cross-tabulate all cyber events that pertain to a 
particular actor or all the attacks that are using a similar attack vector. Understanding these 
relationships and links can help the end user to develop a cyber strategy program.  
 
In much of the previous literature, security taxonomies were divided into three general 
categories: attack, vulnerability, and intrusions. These are subjected to be technical taxonomies 
which can be used at the operational level by cyber security analysts during risk assessment, 
mitigation, and control programs. Mirkovic and Reiher (2004) have created a taxonomy of 
DDOS attacks for classifying threats and defense related to DDOS. Zhu, Cebula and Young 
(2010) have suggested a taxonomy for attacks and vulnerabilities that target SCADA systems. 
Khattak, Ramay et al. (2014) have proposed a taxonomy of botnet behavior, detection and 
defense to classify the characteristics of the botnet threat. Hoque, Baishya et al. (2014) have 
presented a taxonomy of network tools and systems that could be used to conduct cyber attacks. 
Loukas, Gan et al. (2013) developed a taxonomy of attack and defense mechanisms that could be 
applied to emergency management. All these taxonomy may help the cyber defenders to 
understand how cyber intrusion can be triggered.     
 
In contrast, some recent studies have attempted to illustrate a series of cyber activities, events or 
incidents that are relatively associated with each other, so the various categories can interact, 
link, and collaborate to describe the cyber threat. These studies go beyond the context of 
phenomena by looking at the motivation, relationships, interaction and impacts of cyber attacks. 
These taxonomies can be counted for strategic taxonomies that can be called in the planning of 
cyber strategies (Scott and Angelos, 2013 and Uma and Padmavathi, 2013).   
 
 
3. Cyber Defense Reference Model:  
The U.S Air Force research laboratory has presented a cyber-kinetic reference model that can be 
used during cyber attacks (Mudge and Lingley 2008). This study has adopted this reference 
model -with slight changes in the order-to demonstrate the cyber defense capabilities (See Figure 
1). We perceive that the proposed model can describe the interaction between cyber defense 
capabilities and preparation processes that are required to protect the assets. It is closely matched 
with research objectives by accommodating previous study shortcomings. First, this model can 
mitigate cyber attacks that end in cyber-physical loss. Second, defense capabilities are strategy-
driven controls that can be called to defend or respond to cyber threats; thus the depicted model 
can also be used as a tool during the planning for a cyber defense strategy. Third, cyber security 
is achieved by interaction and synergy between capabilities, cyber processes and critical assets, 
which is essential to safeguard against a sophisticated blended attack. Moreover, the proposed 
model can provide enough insight to illustrate and respond to blended and complex cyber 
attacks. Furthermore, it can provide an opportunity for defenders to respond to a physical impact 






Figure 1: Cyber-Kinetic Reference Model 
 
 
4. Criteria for an Acceptable Taxonomy     
The requirement for an acceptable taxonomy has been demonstrated comprehensively in 
previous literature. Hansman and Hunt (2004), and Lindquist and Johnson (1997) enumerated 
several characteristics for a good taxonomy like, accepted, comprehensible, exhaustive, 
repeatable, unambiguous, useful and mutually exclusive. 
 
Pertinent to taxonomy evolution, Igure et al (2008) has conducted a comprehensive survey on 
available taxonomies between 1984 and 2005, in contrast with the extant literature they 
perceived that taxonomy’s classes do not need to be mutually exclusive for the following 
reasons. First, to produce a greater coverage. Second, a vulnerability which cannot be detected 
under one category might be discovered under a second category. Moreover, with the advent of 
blended attacks which are using multiple attack vectors, classification of a threat or vulnerability 
under one category cannot provide a comprehensive understanding of the links between 
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5. Cyber Capability Defense Model and Taxonomy  
The primary objective of this study was to provide a taxonomy that could differentiate between 
the various types of defensive mechanisms that could be used to mitigate or respond to cyber 
attacks. 
 
It also assists the users to link and transit between dimensions and sub-categories to apply 
appropriate defense mechanisms in order to cope with the ever-changing nature of cyber attacks. 
Applying an appropriate defense strategy requires the identification of all the key actors in the 
cyberspace. The actors are an intrinsic part of cyber incidents whether for being accountable as 
the attack perpetrator or assisting the attacked parties to repel or respond to cyber attacks. 
Therefore, unlike the previous studies, the proposed taxonomy has attempted to identify all 
involved players in cyberspace.       
 
Figure 2 provides an overview of proposed taxonomy, which is divided into three distinct 
dimensions: asset, capability and preparation processes. Since this taxonomy is designed to be 
expandable, the additional dimensions or categories can be added to satisfy the future needs.  
 
 
Figure 2: Cyber Capability Defense Model and Taxonomy Overview 
5.1 Assets 
Asset can be defined as resources valuable to governments, organizations and individuals (ISO 
2012) that are related to cyberspace. Assets possess tangible or intangible value that is needed to 
be protected against cyber threats.  
 
5.1.1 Hardware 
A hardware asset is defined by any technological equipment that facilitates a service or value to 
the end users. Hardware are used to transfer, store, process, control or present the information or 
services to the users.  Computers, network equipment, IT Infrastructure, SCADA systems and 
fibre cables are examples of hardware assets.   
 
5.1.2 Software  
A software asset refers to IT application, software or database that is widely used by individuals, 
organizations or governments. 
 
Capability Preparation ProcessAsset
































 5.1.3 Information  
An information asset refers to information processed, stored and transported by internetworked 
information systems (ISACA 2014).    
 
5.1.4 People 
People relate to human factors of cyberspace who are often targeted as the principals of cyber 
attacks. People are actively interacting with cyberspace through seeking or facilitating particular 
services (Von Solms and Van Niekerk 2013).  
 
5.2 Capabilities 
Cyber capabilities are defined by the ability of a cyber defender to prepare, prevent, detect and 
respond to a cyber attack (Jordan and Hallingstad 2011).The capabilities are very complex, 
technical, strategic and operational abilities of a defender to confront a cyber threat. This notion 
requires the development of strategic tools for active and passive defense and collaboration with 
other key players.      
 
 5.2.1 Passive Defense (PD)  
PD (See Figure 3) refers to all the measures and controls that could be used passively to protect, 
detect, respond and recover to the cyber threat. PD will provide a vehicle to focus on making 










Figure 3: Passive Defense Classification 
 
Protect 
Protect refers to prepare and implement the proper safeguards to ensure the delivery of service 
assets (NIST, 2014). Cyber security protection can be achieved by using whitelisting techniques, 
defense-in-depth mechanisms or patching processes. Antivirus software, firewalls, access 
controls, penetration testing, audits are examples of system protection.  
 
Detect 
Detect refers to developing and implementing processes and activities to discover the occurrence 
of cyber events (NIST, 2014).In this stage, it is assumed that an undesirable event has happened 
in our systems. Detection can be achieved through monitoring and surveillance mechanisms or 
technologies. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), Security Incident Event Management (SIEM), 


















Respond refers to developing and implementing the activities to respond to a detected cyber 
event (NIST, 2014).A successful response will contain the effect and impact of cyber attack. For 
instance, Network segregation and Internet kill switch are the technical solutions; often by 
autocratic governments; to respond or to mitigate the severe impact of cyber threats.       
 
Recover 
Recovery refers to developing and implementing activities or processes that restore the 
compromised or degraded services to its normal operation (NIST, 2014).Business continuity and 
Disaster recovery are the programs that can be used to minimize the disruptive effect of cyber 
incidents.    
 
5.2.2 Active Defense (AD)  
AD(See Figure 4) refers to a real-time capability to minimize the impact of the cyber attacks 
(Rosenweig, 2014). AD may use some types of offensive ability to discover, destruct, disrupt, 
degrade or nullify incoming cyber threats. Denning (2014) perceived that all of the safeguards in 
AD are analogous to air and missile defense aims to shoot down or deflect the attacker’s missile 













Figure 4: Active Defense Classification 
  
 
Cyber-Kinetic (Cyber Adjunct to Kinetic) Operation:  
The intent of cyber-kinetic is to defend against kinetic effects of cyber attacks through an active 
defense operation. Cyber adjunct to kinetic operation can be classified as the following:   
 Destruction- Destruction occurs when the IT hardware or equipment is modified from their 
original stage; hence the damaged devices are malfunctioned or not function properly. s. 
Stuxnet worm, Siberian pipeline sabotage or operation Orchard  are examples of destruction 
operation by means of cyber kinetic capabilities (Clarke and Knake 2011).     
 Disruption- Disruption refers to a kind of denial of service or unauthorised usage of resources 
in which the target’s resources are fully exhausted, consumed or unavailable to the legitimate 
users.   
 Degradation- Degradation of service occurs when the required services are falling outside 
predetermined service level, so the legitimate user will experience the lower quality of 
service (QOS).   
Cyber-Kinetic 
Operation









 Nullification- Nullification refers to the ability of an entity to nullify a cyber attack by using 
electronic or cyber capability (Andress and Winterfeld 2011).    
 Discovery- Discovery is the ability of an entity to discover valuable information about the 
target from various sources. Social engineering and Reconnaissance are the methods that can 
control human behaviour to acquire useful information about a prospective target. Phishing, 
Vishing, Psychological operation (Psyops) and Open source Intelligence (OSINT)) are the 
common types of discovery operation.   
 
5.2.3 Collaborative Defense 
Collaborative defense, see Figure 4, is the ability of a defender to rely on the support of 
organizations, international bodies or other nations to stop a cyber attack. Collaborative defense 













Intelligence refers to the collected information that are analysed and contextualized; so it can be 
used by policy makers for efficient decision-making on matters of interest. Intelligence sharing 
can be an asymmetric operation that one party may share more information than their 
counterparts. It also helps involved parties to achieve superiority in cyberspace (Rovner, 
Mahoney et al. 2013). Echelon operation, Magic Lantern and Five Eye (FVEY) operations are 
sitting in this setting (Andress and Winterfeld 2011, Janczewski 2014). 
 
Infrastructure Sharing 
Infrastructure sharing is a strategy that used to share infrastructure to drive innovation, reducing 
the cost and increasing the security safeguards (Hathaway 2014).  
 
Knowledge Sharing  
Knowledge sharing programs can help cyber allies to achieve higher skills and experiences.    
Cyber coalitions can exchange their knowledge and experiences in training and awareness 
programs, research and development projects, and cyber exercises. The US Cyber Storm III 
exercise and NATO Cyber Sea maneuver are falling into this section (Klimburg 2012).  
 
5.2.3 Actors 
Actors are the entities that are interacting and participating in cyber activities (See Figure 6). 
 
Collaborative Defense





























Figure 6: Actor Classification 
 
 
Organized Actor  
Any actors with a basic command structure, resources, funds, vision and objectives are counted 
as organized actors (Bruderlein 2000).  
 Intergovernmental Organization (IGO) - Many IGOs (see Table 1) are focusing on 
international cyber security issues. IGOs vary significantly in size, scope, expertise and 
legitimacy (Kahn, McConnell et al. 2011). 
 
IGOs Liability Cyber Activity Members 
United Nations (UN) 
International treaty 
based with legal 
authority 














European Union (EU) Governing body Legislation, policy maker 28 countries 





cyber/military Prevention and 
Response cooperation 
33 countries 
Organization  for Economic Co-
operation and Development(OECD) 
International  Forum Publications and reports 34 countries 
Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation(APEC) 
International  Forum Publications and reports 21 countries 
Organization  for Security Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) 
Regional Security 
Organization  
Training , workshops and reports 
57  countries 
11 partners 
 
Table 1: IGOs and Related Cyber Activities  
 
 International Internet Technical Organization  (IITO)-IITO are managing and developing 
standards, protocols and technical documents (Kahn, McConnell et al. 2011).  
 Institution- Institutions is a structure or mechanism with a particular behaviour. In the cyber 
domain, institutions are created in response to imminent cyber threats. These institutions are 
funded  national authority with international scope; however they are not in a form of IGOs 




IITO Structure Cyber Activity 
Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers(ICANN)  
Non-Profit corporation  
Manage IP addresses and DNS 
  
Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF)  
Non-Profit corporation 
Design and develop technology, 
protocols and guideline  
The World Wide Web Consortium 
(W3C)  
Committee  Web Standards  
 
Table 2: IITOs and Related Activates 
 
 
Institutions Scope Cyber Activity 
Computer Emergency Response 
Team Coordination Centre  (CERT –
CC)  
International Coordination of global CERT  
Asia Pacific( AP)-CERT  Regional -Asia Asian Regional coordination  
TF-CSIRT Regional -Europe European regional coordination  
Forum of Incident Response and 
Security Teams(FIRST) 
International Forum and Information sharing  
International Multilateral Partnership 
Against Cyber Threat(IMPACT)  
International  Global threat response centre 
 
Table 3: Institutions and Related Activates 
  
 Criminals- Cyber criminals are the enterprises that seek to achieve financial gain through 
illegal activities. As cyber criminals become more decentralised, they become more 
organized and gain more technical knowledge and resources. 
 Terrorists and Militia groups – Cyber terrorists can impose a permanent cyber threat to the 
government and populace by attacking networks, information systems and infrastructure that 
are using internetworked information systems (Kallberg and Thuraisingham 2013).   
 
Non-Organized 
Any actors without the basic requirements of organized actors can be defined as non-organized 
actors.  
 Hackers- Hackers are often individuals who exploit vulnerabilities in a computer or system 
networks. Hacker’s motivations are varied broadly from reputation to financial gains. 
Hackers’ morals or ethics are the metrics that are classified as Black Hat, White Hat, and 
Grey Hat, etc.       
 Hacktivists -Hacktivists are often politically motivated individual hackers that attack specific 
targets to achieve ideological goals.    
 Whistleblowers- Whistleblowers are mainly individuals that are exposing and leaking 
misconducts or illegal activities occurring in governments, organizations, etc. The recent 
revelation of Snowden is an example of this activity.       
 Cyber Warrior-Cyber fighters are nationally motivated citizens that are acting against other 
political parties that are opposing them.  
 
5.3 Preparation Process 
The Art of War has given us the challenges to not rely on the likelihood of the enemy’s not 
coming, instead on our readiness to receive them (Sun-tzu, Sawyer et al. 1994).The preparation 
process will help an entity to prepare and develop a cyber response plan prior to a cyber attack. 
Providing sufficient preparation will facilitate smooth execution of a cyber capability during a 
cyber attack. The image of cyberspace, threat and vulnerability is changing prominently over a 
period; hence developing a single defense strategy is not compelling, considering the complex 
nature and severe impacts of cyber attacks. While the need for multiple defense strategies is 
evident, the preparation phase will also facilitate a smooth transition to various cyber capabilities 
during a cyber attack.  
    
5.3.1 Planning 
The planning phase require to prepare an approach for a cyber defense plan prior to a cyber 
attack. The planning phase require to consider the worst case and best case attack scenarios to 
help the defenders to apply the most appropriate defense capabilities.  
 
5.3.2 Communication 
Communication Preparation require to establish a comprehensive plan to interact with all the 
required stakeholders during and prior to the cyber threat. 
 
5.3.3 Activation 
Developing a process to activate a cyber defense capability in a timely manner.  
 
5.3.4 Evaluate  
All the preparation procedures need to be continuously tested, evaluated and updated to ensure 
that they are enforced during cyber attack incidents. The evaluation can be performed through 
audits, maneuvers, exercise and previous experiences.  
 
6. Conclusion and Future Work   
The overall objective of development this taxonomy was providing all interested parties -
researchers, business and government organizations- with a tool for an overall evaluation of their 
security status and quick finding of weak points of their cyber defense mechanisms. As we 
indicated in the introduction to this paper, our approach to the problem was taken from so-called 
McCumber Cube (2004). In this Cube, all security issues are grouped into small spaces and 
evaluated separately. We believe that the same approach should be used in researching security 
systems. Foundation stone of such method is based on the development of a useful taxonomy of 
cyber defenses capabilities. And it was the main objective of this research. The taxonomy has 
been introduced through a process of modification of a base cyber defense model, which can be 
used as a foundation for national cyber defense development.  
We assume that this taxonomy and cyber defense process model will be useful to cyber 
defenders to grasp a better understanding of cyber defense capabilities that can be used to 
mitigate and respond to the cyber attacks. Governments and organizations can use the different 
categories of this taxonomy to build a robust and an effective cyber defense strategy to safeguard 
against the cyber threats. The proposed study also provides a valuable insight to cyber security 
controls and mechanisms that can be used to mitigate current cyber attacks.  
We do not claim that this study has addressed all possible security controls; however, we 
perceive that the taxonomy can be used by the cyber security practitioners to facilitate cyber 
security implementation.        
 
From the organization perspective, this study has classified various international agencies, 
organizations and authorities that can offer technical and logistical support to the nation states 
and cyber defenders. The proposed taxonomy is extensible; hence other scholars can add other 
dimensions or classifications to the current study. The Attacker’s motivations are not addressed 
in this study so future research can focus on the motivational aspect of cyber attacks.  
 
Finally, taxonomies need to get updated with the rapid speed of changes in technology, attack 
mechanism, regulation or attacker motivation. We will constantly try to track these changes and 
apply them to our taxonomy to make it current.                          
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